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INTRODUCTION

Justice Thurgood Marshall reportedly liked to remind his clerks that "[t]he
Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid laws."' The
2
Constitution also does not prohibit legislatures from enacting immoral laws,
which have often brought lawyers to struggle with the dilemma of choosing

Recipient of the 2015 American Inns of Court Warren E. Burger Prize. Third-year law
student at the University of Colorado School of Law

1.

N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 209 (2008) (Stevens, J.,

concurring).
2.
See U.S. CONST. art. I.

163
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between what is legal and what is right.3 In Antigone, the Greek tragedian
Sophocles explores this very dilemma.4 Antigone begins with a scene in which
Antigone tells her sister that their brother had died in combat, and that the
warlord who had killed him declared that the death penalty faced anyone who
dared bury her brother. Antigone's opening chapters explore just how torn its
eponymous character feels between obeying the law and obeying the moral
6
impulse to provide her brother with the honor of a proper burial.
The conflict between immoral laws and one's moral compass was as much
of a pressing issue in Antigone's time as it is today, with mandatory sentencing
guidelines, certain Guantanamo Bay practices, and rules of professional conduct
that have pushed outstanding attorneys into committing immoral acts. Attorneys
and non-attorneys alike continue to struggle with Antigone's Dilemma.
However, attorneys see an especially difficult problem from Antigone's
Dilemma because of their close involvement with perpetuating the legal system.
As this Essay will explore, the conflict between immoral laws and moral
conscience can be a matter of life and death not only in Antigone's time, but
even today. Attorneys today, like their predecessors in generations past, have
four ways to cope with Antigone's Dilemma. Attorneys can: (1) ignore their
conscience, (2) ignore the dilemma by withdrawing from the case, (3) ignore the
law, or (4) ignore the law's original intent by reaching an alternative
interpretation that aligns with the conclusion the interpreter desires.
This Essay explores the shortcomings of these four options, then proposes
the adoption of a new framework. The new framework is based in large part on
the "law as integrity" model advanced by Professor Ronald Dworkin.
Dworkin's model turns on ethical discretion and therefore addresses the source
of the problem of immoral laws, namely the inflexibility of the guidelines,
practices, and model rules that can result in inadvertently but patently immoral
outcomes. 9 Though a number of modem-day laws raise Antigone Dilemma
issues, this Essay focuses on the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.' 0 The Model Rules serve as a case study into a well-

3.
See generally J.C. Oleson, The Antigone Dilemma: When the Paths ofLaw and Morality
Diverge, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 669, 670 (2007) (describing the Antigone dilemma as a "choice
between command and conscience").
4.
See SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE (David Mulroy trans., Univ. of Wis. Press 2013) (441 B.C.).
5.
Id. at 3-5.
6.
Id. at 5-7.
7.
ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 6
(1975).
8.
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 119-20 (1986).
9.
See generally id. (describing the law as integrity model as "not limit[ing] law to what
convention finds in past decisions but direct[ing judicial decision makers] also to regard as law what
morality would suggest to be the best justification of these past decisions").
10. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (AM. BAR Ass'N 1984) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES].
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intentioned set of rules whose inflexibility constrains attorney behavior,
sometimes to the point of forcing attorneys to engage in immoral conduct against
their own will.
Dworkin's model offers a glimpse into how the
reconceptualization of the Model Rules as rebuttable presumptions can more
effectively address an attorney's moral concerns while retaining the
predictability and order that the current rule-based system enjoys.
Under the current regime, the Model Rules provide a number of general
scenarios in which attorneys must, may, or must not act in a prescribed manner."
But under a Dworkian regime, these ethical rules would presumptively apply
unless their applicability to a novel and unforeseen circumstance were rebutted
12
on ethical grounds.
Dworkin's model and this Essay's additions to it
reconceptualize the Model Rules as rebuttable presumptions, presumptions that
attorneys must consider and can rebut if they find sufficient reason to act
otherwise.
Part II of this Essay overviews the Model Rules and examines their impact
on Spaulding v. Zimmerman,13 which serves as an excellent litmus test of the
kinds of ethical dilemmas facing most attorneys today.1 4 In Part III, this Essay
analyzes the shortcomings of the solutions that attorneys and academics have
relied on in their attempts to resolve the dilemma.' 5 Part IV delves into this
Essay's case for why Dworkin's model holds out great promise in the effort to
finally resolve today's Antigone Dilemma scenario.16 Part V then outlines the
advantages of reconceptualizing the Model Rules into rebuttable model
-17

presumptions.
II.

RULES OF ETHICS, LEGAL POSITIVISM, AND THE DILEMMA OF IMMORAL
LAWS

A.

Overview of the Model Rules

An "ethics rule" is an oxymoron. Rules by definition restrain the kinds of
individual autonomy and personal responsibility that characterize ethicality.' 8

11. See generally id. at r. 1.6 (requiring attorneys to keep client information confidential, but
allowing them to disclose the information in several specific situations).
12. Michael Gentithes, Precedent, Humility, and Justice, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 835,
853 (2012).
13. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d704 (Minn. 1962).
14. See generally id. (describing the ethical dilemma faced by a defense attorney who
acquired exclusive knowledge of a plaintiff s life threatening medical condition).
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See Steven R. Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict: The Trouble with LawBased Conceptions of Ethics, 68 IND. L.J. 101, 104-05, 129 (1992); see also W. Bradley Wendel,
Public Values and ProfessionalResponsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 10 (1999) (quoting L.
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Put another way, rules and ethics are incompatible because where rules produce
obedience, ethics are the product of free will. Further, a categorical rule "ignores
the aspirational dimension of professional ethics,"1 9 and "assumes that the legal
rules may be applied mechanically, without resort to creative normative
judgment." 20 Taken to the absurd extreme, the problem with undermining
autonomy and responsibility is perhaps best exemplified in an episode of It's
Always Sunny in Philadelphia.21A character learns that his friends have rescued
an abandoned human baby from a filthy dumpster, and advises, "Well, put it
back! It doesn't belong to you." 22 Still, the deeply interpersonal and adversarial

nature of lawyering ensures that attorneys will always need some guidance on
how to resolve ethical conflicts. This need for guidance, in addition to the legal
profession's overall interest in shining a positive light on the public image of
attorney conduct and the practice of law, brought a committee of the ABA in
23
1905 to investigate the possibility of drafting a code of legal ethics.
The
committee formulated a number of canons, whose general principles and moral
appeals offered advice-albeit, unenforceable advice-to perplexed attorneys. 24
Concerned about the lack of voluntary compliance with the unenforceable
canons, the ABA in 1970 reinforced those canons with a model code of ethics,
written like a statute for states to adopt as binding legislation that disciplinary
institutions could enforce.25 This remodeling of the canons-and the subsequent
remodeling of the code into its current form, with its eight sections of rules and
scores of "comments"-created a distinctly regulatory model of ethical conduct
26
among attorneys.
Other scholars take a dimmer view of the regulatory model,
referring to it instead as imposing a model of "technocratic lawyering"27 or, as

RAY PATTERSON & THOMAS B. METZLOFF, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1982)) ("Although most of our law is morally based, the term ethics implies the

antithesis of law. Ethical rules focus on individual and voluntary moral responses, not legally
mandated duties.")
19. See Wendel, supra note 18, at 12.
20. Id. at 17.
21. It's Always Sunny in Philadelphia(FX television).
22. It's Always Sunny in Philadelphia: The Gang Finds a Dumpster Baby (FX television
broadcast Sept. 13, 2007).
23. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 23-25 (1953).
24. See id. at 26-27.
25. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1251
(1991). Some scholars are careful to only call the Model Rules a code of "professional conduct"
instead of a code of ethical conduct. See id. at 1241-42. Other scholars observe that "[n]o term in
the legal lexicon has been more abused than 'professionalism."' Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling
Professionalismand Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1307 (1995).
26. See Wendel, supra note 18, at 9 (referring to the Model Rules as imposing a "regulatory
model").
27. Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical
Deliberators?,69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 886 (1996); see also Wendel, supra note 18, at 54 (stating
that legal positivism reduces attorneys to "amoral technicians, who bring to the lawyer-client
relationship nothing more than expertise in the complex apparatus of the legal system. This
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Dworkin put it, "conventionalism." 28 However one views the Model Rules and
their effect on lawyering, most agree that "[t]here can be little doubt that the
current embodiment of legal ethics in disciplinary 'codes,' whether enacted by
state legislatures or adopted by state supreme courts, has transformed legal ethics
into positive law." 29
Put simply, legal positivism is a commitment to law.30 This commitment to
law "has come to dominate American and European legal thought,"3' and its
commitment traces the validity of a law from that law's procedural sources
instead of from its substantive merits. 32 By prioritizing the source of a law over
its merits, the interpreters of a law must "set aside their roles as independent
moral agents and act as impartial functionaries within our legal institutions." 33
In his nomination hearing to the U.S. Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Roberts
portrayed the casting aside of independent moral agency somewhat more
memorably, saying:
Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply
them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure
everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody ever went
to a ball game to see the umpire. Judges have to have the humility to
recognize that they operate within a system of precedent.34
The Model Rules reflects positivist thought because by providing categorical
answers to the most common kinds of moral dilemmas, the rules turn every

conception of the lawyer's role eliminates valued traits such as prudence and professional judgment,
which are important goods the lawyer brings to a representation").
28. See DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 114-50.
29. Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal
Ethics, 80 IOWA L. REV. 901, 905 (1995) (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Legal and Ethical
Position of the Code of ProfessionalEthics, in 5 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: JOURNALISM, LAW,
MEDICINE 5-7 (Louis Hodges ed., 1979)).
30. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 7-9 (1998) (explaining how "the
lawyer must-or at least may-pursue any goal of the client through any arguably legal course of
action and assert any nonfrivolous legal claim").
31. Harold J. Berman, Law and Logos, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 143, 151 (1994); see also Robert
M. Palumbos, Within Each Lawyer's Conscience a Touchstone: Law, Morality, and Attorney Civil
Disobedience, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (2005) ("Positivism remains, by and large, the
dominant American approach toward legal ethics today.").
32. See John Gardner, Legal Postivism: 5% Myths, 46 AM. JUR. 199, 201 (2001) ("In any
legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of
that system, depends on its sources, not its merits.").
33. Oleson, supra note 3, at 672.
34. Id. at 691 (quoting ConfirmationHearing on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice)).
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attorney into an umpire.3 5 Further, the Model Rules' preamble outright states
that while "many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise[, and s]uch
issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral
judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules[,]" a lawyer's
conduct nevertheless "should conform to the requirements of the law ....
A central tenant of legal positivism's commitment to law is its separation
between legal validity and moral considerations.3 7 This neutrality over moral
concerns makes legal positivism seemingly appropriate, if not ideal, for a
pluralistic American society. Moreover, many positivists argue that moral
concerns can negatively impact the attomey-client relationship, saying that "once
the lawyer has assumed responsibility to represent a client, the zealousness of
that representation cannot be tempered by the lawyer's moral judgments of the
client or of the client's cause."3 8 However, the separation between law and
morality necessarily means that an individual's disagreement with the morality
of a law would not excuse that person from the duty to obey it.
Legal positivism is as apathetic to populist sentiments as it is to the
attorney's own moral concerns. At times, this separation between law and
morality has helped push major progress through the legal system but at times,
this separation has also set back major progress through the legal system. 39 As
populist judges sat on their hands at key moments in American legal history,
positivist attorneys struck down the segregation laws that had infested the Jim
Crow South, 40 upheld the right of association for communists during the "red
scare," 4 ' and protected the free speech rights of flag bumers.4 2 Most recently,

35. See generally MODEL RULES, supra note 10, at r. 1.6 (requiring attorneys to keep client
information confidential, but allowing disclosure in specific situations).
36. Compare id. at Pmbl. (stating that while the rules often "prescribe terms for resolving
such [ethical] conflicts," there remain "many difficult issues of professional discretion
[that] . . must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment
guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules."), with id. at Pmbl (stating that "[a] lawyer's
conduct should conform to the requirements of the law . . . .").
37. See generally H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation ofLaw and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593, 617 (1958) (describing legal positivism as "the insistence on the separation of the law
as it is from law as it ought to be").
38. Monroe H. Freedman, PersonalResponsibility in a ProfessionalSystem, 27 CATH. U. L.
REV. 191, 199 (1978) (citing MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 9 (1975)).

39.

Compare Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (ignoring strong moral

sentiments of the time and striking down segregation on constitutional grounds), with Plessy v.

Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (following popular sentiment of the day and upholding
segregation).

40. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (forcing
private businesses to abide by the Civil Rights Act); Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (finding public school
segregation unconstitutional).

41. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957), overruled by Burks v. United States,
437 U.S. 1 (1978).
42. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 397, 420 (1989).
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the Supreme Court continued this proud tradition by maintaining the due process
43
rights of Guantanamo Bay detainees despite urgent national security concerns.4
These judicial opinions ignored the strong moral sentiments of their day, and
focused instead on the constitutional principles from which society had strayed
in the heat of the moment.44 In constitutional cases, it certainly helps the
positivist cause to know that the United States Constitution is a profoundly
visionary document. But in some constitutional cases, positivism has led
attorneys to perpetuate immoral laws.45 Much like their counterparts in
Apartheid South Africa46 and fascist Germany,47 antebellum American judges
maintained fugitive slave laws despite their own moral concerns because "law is
law."4 8 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Fugitive
Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850, which authorized the federal government to return
slaves to the South if they were caught in the North. 49 Feeling duty-bound, most
judges also simply upheld the Fugitive Slave Acts. Others manipulated the acts
to achieve just results.50 One scholar noted, in an observation reminiscent to
Justice Roberts' analogy to umpires, that "there was a general, pervasive

&

43. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (finding the Military
Commissions act of 2006 was unconstitutional and all detainees at Guantanamo had a right to
habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 634-35 (2006) (finding that U.S. military
commissions violated procedural rights for enemy detainees); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485
(2004) (finding that detainees are entitled to file habeas corpus petitions in federal courts, and thus
ensuring that Guantanamo Bay would see judicial, and not exclusively executive, oversight).
Interestingly, "the fact is that since the Supreme Court decided Boumediene in 2008, there have
been few reports of the United States capturing high-value targets. This reality may well indicate
that efforts to grant detainees more rights have instead instigated an unforeseen and unintended shift
away from capture and toward targeted killing." Carla Crandalla, If You Can 't Beat Them, Kill
Them: Complex Adaptive Systems Theory and the Rise in TargetedKilling, 43 SETON HALL L. REV.
595, 633 (2013). "[I]t may well be that the government's expanded use of drones arose as an
unexpected and unintended consequence of prior efforts to grant detainees greater civil liberties."
Id. at 641. One might wonder what role this shift in focus may have played in the decision to kill
instead of capture Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011.
44. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798 (stating that "[t]he laws and Constitution are designed
to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times").
45. COVER, supra note 7, at 119-23.
46. See generally DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: SOUTH
AFRICAN LAW IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 52-53, 82 (1991) (examining the South
African judiciary's maintenance of racially unequal legislation).
47. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 648-61 (1958); see also Hart, supra note 37, at 617 (discussing Gustav Radbruch, a
leading German legal theorist, who recanted his belief in pure positivism after the evils it permitted
under the Nazi regime).
48. COVER, supra note 7 at 119-23.
49. See generally, e.g., Jeffrey M. Schmitt, The Antislavery Judge Reconsidered, 29 LAW
HIST. REV. 797, 799-802 (2011) (explaining the political context in which antislavery judges
operated in order to better understand why they supported the Fugitive Slave Act); Karla Mari
McKanders, Immigration Enforcement and the Fugitive Slave Acts: Exploring Their Similarities, 61
CATH. U. L. REV. 921, 926 (2012) (providing information on the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793).
50. See COVER, supra note 7, at 198.
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disparity between the individual's image of himself as a moral human
being . . . and his image of himself as a faithful judge, applying legal rules
impersonally ....

B.

The CriticalRole that the Model Rules Played in Spaulding

Spaulding v. Zimmerman52 illustrates how positivism can encourage, if not
53
compel, immoral conduct.
In Spaulding, a Minnesota defense attorney in a
personal injury lawsuit learned, through routine discovery, of a plaintiffs
potentially life-threatening aorta aneurysm.54 If the defense attorney informed
the plaintiff or his attorney about the existence of this aneurysm, then the
plaintiff could have removed the threat with immediate surgery.
But the
defense attorney failed to disclose the aneurysm and left the plaintiff to a likely
death, because the defense attorney read the ABA's governing disciplinary rules
to forbid such a disclosure as a violation of the near-sacrosanct rule of attorney56
client confidentiality.
Both the trial judge and Minnesota's supreme court
agreed with the defense attorney's assessment.
In a similar scenario that
weighed the value of professional conduct against the value of human life,
known as the "Innocent Convict" scenario, an attorney's client reveals that he
committed the crime for which another person will be executed.5
As in
Spaudling, the rules of confidentiality clearly stated that disclosure would be
forbidden for the innocent convict.59
Though updated to prevent another Spaulding or Innocent Convict
60
situation, the Model Rules continue to use the kind of categorical reasoning
that makes no room for affirmative defenses, such as the affirmative defense that
Professor David Luban called ethical "disobedience." 61 Because of this, the fact
that the Model Rules have been updated does not change the fact that, had the
defense attorney in Spaulding engaged in ethical disobedience by revealing the
information, then a disciplinary institution in the form of a bar committee or
supreme court would have seen little choice but to discipline that attorney. The
current framework reflects the positivist view that sparing the proverbial rod of

Id. at 228.
Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
Id. at 707-08.
Id.
55. Id. at 708.
56. Id. at 709-10.
57. Id. at 706, 711.
58. Monroe H. Freedman, The Life-Saving Exception to Confidentiality: Restating Law
Without the Was, the Will Be, or the Ought to Be, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1631, 1632 (1996).
59. Id. at 1633 (citing RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132
cmt. E, illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 1989)).
60. MODEL RULES, supra note 10, at r. 1.6(b)(1).
61. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 35 (1988).
51.

52.
53.
54.
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discipline for ethics violations would undermine the legal authority of the ABA
rules and encourage lawlessness. This lack of an affirmative defense ensures
that when the Model Rules inadvertently compel an attorney to engage in clearly
immoral behavior, that attorney will not be able to justify a violation of the
Model Rules on ethical grounds.
In contrast to the demands of positivist law, the affirmative defense of
ethical discretion follows the model of natural law. Natural law "posits that legal
norms embody underlying values of fairness, democracy and order and that
obligations must be interpreted in terms of these values."6 2 In short, natural law
concerns the "internal morality of the law."63 While it is a stretch of the
imagination to call for the legal profession to abandon the Model Rules, an
exception made for the affirmative defense of ethical disobedience (or, as this
Essay terms it, ethical discretion)64 would enable attorneys to challenge the
application of an ethics rule to an extraordinary and unforeseen circumstance.
Part III below will begin that discussion by outlining several alternative options
to an ethical discretion defense, then surveying their critical shortcomings.65
III. FOUR COPING MECHANISMS FOR THE DILEMMA OF IMMORAL LAWS

Henry Thoreau noted three solutions to the problem of immoral laws when
he said, "Unjust laws exist: shall we be content to obey them, or shall we
endeavor to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we
transgress them at once?" 66 In Justice Accused,67 Professor Robert Cover
68
explores those three options and identifies a fourth.
Cover's analysis turns on
what the attorney chooses to ignore.69 First, attorneys can ignore their moral
reservations by perpetuating the legally valid but morally wrong law.70 Second,
attorneys can ignore the dilemma by withdrawing from the troubling case, or by
withdrawing from the legal profession altogether. 7 ' Third, attorneys can ignore
72
the law by violating it in ethical disobedience.
And fourth, attorneys can

62. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Military Lawyering at the Edge of the Rule of Law at Guantanamo:
Should Lawyers Be Permittedto Violate the Law?, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 581 (2007).
63. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 96 (rev. ed. 1969).
64. Though this is perhaps a mere matter of semantics, the term "ethical discretion" captures
the idea of rationally using one's moral compass to take action in spite of the rules of professional
conduct. "Ethical disobedience," by contrast, suggests an emotional air of defiance and rebellion
that this Note does not intend to convey.
65. See infra Part III.
66. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1849), reprinted in WALDEN AND
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 224, 231 (Owen Thomas ed., 1966).
67. See COVER, supra note 7.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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attempt to ignore the law's original intent by reaching an alternative
interpretation that aligns with the conclusion the interpreter desires.73
A.

Option One

Option One reflects the "law is law" resignation that positivist thinkers have
relied on throughout history.74 As Justice Holmes explained, "This is a court of
law ... not a court of justice."
If anything, the mandatory nature of the validbut-wicked law makes it easier for judges to treat themselves as humble servants
of the law, or as public notaries who are "there only to approve the assembly-line
bargain . . 76 One former district judge observed that
[p]rior to the sentencing guidelines, a number of judges expressed to
me a view that sentencing was the most difficult part of their job.
Today, the mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines in many
ways make the job of a judge easier. In the vast majority of cases,
judges no longer have to take moral responsibility for the sentence they
impose. They could look a defendant that they have just sentenced [sic]
thirty years in the eye and say, "Don't blame me-I'm just a
scorekeeper." Talk to the Congressmen who voted for this mandatory
minimum sentence.
Just as fidelity to one's client does not suggest agreement with all of the
client's beliefs and actions, neither does fidelity to the law indicate support for or
agreement with the law. Upholding the law does not necessarily entail total
silence on the matter, or even the suppression of one's true beliefs. Many judges
who formally affirm the questionable laws will alleviate their moral discomfort
and perhaps reform the system from within by writing stinging critiques of the
law into their decisions. For instance, Judge Paul Cassell presided over a case
in which a first-time offender received the felony conviction of dealing
marijuana. 79 But because the offender was in possession of a weapon, the

&

73. Id.
74. See id. at 119-23.
75. Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1347 n.28 (M.D. Fla. 2008),
vacated, 611 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting LAWYER'S WITAND WISDOM 152 (Bruce Nash
Allan Zullo eds., 1995)).
76. See Oleson, supra note 3, at 693.
77. Id. at 691 (quoting John S. Morton, Jr., Why Mandatory Minimums Make No Sense,
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS: PUB. POL'Y 311, 311-12 (2004)).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230, 1261 (D. Utah 2004),
aff'd, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying the sentencing guidelines minimum sentence even
though "[t]he court believes that to sentence [the defendant] to prison for the rest of his life is
unjust, cruel, and even irrational").
79. Id. at 1230.
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mandatory minimum sentencing "guidelines" imposed fifty-five years to a crime
that otherwise would receive about six years of imprisonment.so Judge Cassell
sentenced the offender to fifty-five years and one day-fifty-five years, to satisfy
the minimum sentencing guidelines; and one day, for all other crimes
combined.
The judge suspected that he had no other choice, and the Tenth
82
Circuit affirmed his suspicions.
In his judicial opinion, Judge Cassell
described his forced decision as "unjust, cruel, and even irrational." 83 Feeling
"ethically obligated to bring this injustice to the attention of those who are in a
position to do something about it[,]" the judge urged the Office of the Pardon
Attorney to pardon the first-time offender and asked his congressman to reform
84
the mandatory minimum sentencing laws. No action has been taken, and the
first-time offender remains scheduled to be released on November 18, 2051. 85
B.

Option Two

Option Two, disregarding the case altogether, is perhaps the most tempting
option. Attorneys are typically under no obligation to take any given client, and
attorneys are free to withdraw from a case if their moral reservations reach the
86
Through withdrawing, the
point of interfering with their representation.
attorney passes the burden of resolving the dilemma to another attorney.
However, an Option Two withdrawal is not necessarily mere avoidance of
personal culpability, or a selfish "passing of the buck" onto someone else to
resolve. A "noisy withdrawal" can vividly signal one's protest with the law.
Cover notes how antebellum attorneys were condemned not for upholding the
slavery laws, but for failing to withdraw from the cases.87 Judges cannot recuse
themselves as easily and often as attorneys can pass up on or withdraw from a
case, but it is not unheard of for even modem judges to resign in protest of a
law.
District Judge Lawrence Irving publically resigned, for instance, and
explained that "I've had a problem with mandatory sentencing in almost every
case that's come before me ... I just can't do it anymore." 89

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 754 (10th Cir. 2006).
83. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
84. Id. at 1261-63.
85. See Donald A. Dripps, Reinventing Plea Bargaining, 59 (Robina Inst. Conference on the
Future of Criminal Law, Working Paper, 2014) (commenting that Angelos has "an expected release
date of November 18, 2051"); Nightline: Locked Up for Life on a Nonviolent Drug Bust (ABC
television broadcast Aug. 12, 2015) (noting that President Obama has not yet commuted Angelos's
sentence).
86. MODEL RULES, supra note 10, at r. 1.16.
87. See COVER, supra note 7, at 153-54 (quoting WENDELL PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTION:
A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT 171, 181 (3d ed. 1856)).
88. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.11 (A)(2)(c) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2011).
89. U.S. Judge Quits over Sentencing Rules, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 1990, § 1, at 6.
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The sentiment is understandable, considering that judges often find
themselves conducting an absurd charade in which they must instruct defendants
about how to report to a probation office upon their release, in one hundred and
fifty years. 90 The demonstrated conviction in Judge Irving's resignation caught
headlines and catalyzed discussion about sentencing guidelines, 9 1 but the result
had no more effect than Judge Cassell's written protests. Had Judge Cassell
publically resigned, a first-time marijuana offender would in all likelihood
continue to remain in prison until November 18, 2051 because of the pistol in his
pocket. Tempting as it may be to withdraw in protest of an immoral law,
attorney withdrawals are also problematic to the overall cause of fixing the law
because the attorneys driven to withdraw from cases for moral reasons are also
the very attorneys who are likely the "most inclined to try to encourage positive
changes in controlling law." 92
C.

Option Three

Option Three calls for activism, encouraging attorneys to disregard the law
by fighting it. Option Three essentially brings the concept of civil disobedience
to the legal profession. This is a tempting option to attorneys who relish a fight
and wish to give voice to the Augustinian claim that "an unjust law is no law at
all." 93 Attorney noncompliance is a serious matter, however, given the fact that
"[a]ttomeys enjoy unique privilege and power within the judicial system; their
rights, status, and actions inherently affect our legal environment in ways that
those of other citizens do not." 94 Even judges have engaged in Option Three
activism. 95 Judge James Lawrence King sentenced an eighty-three-year-old drug
courier to less than two months of prison, when the mandatory minimum
96
sentence called for a ten-year sentence.
Judge Walter Jay Skinner also
reduced-at least, he attempted to reduce-the mandatory minimum sentence in
a pornography case. 97 Both judges found themselves promptly and perhaps
embarrassingly reversed on appeal.98 As their appellate overseers explained,

90. See Oleson, supra note 3, at 683-84 (quoting United States v. Hungerford, 465 F.3d
1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2006)).
91. U.S. Judge Quits over Sentencing Rules, supra note 89, § 1.
92. Jack B. Weinstein, Every Day Is a Good Day for a Judge to Lay Down His Professional
Life for Justice, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 131, 140 (2004).
93. AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL bk. I, § 5, at 8 (Thomas Williams trans.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1993) (c. 400 C.E.).
94. Palumbos, supra note 31, at 1062.
95. See generally United States v. Studley, 907 F.2d 254, 257 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that the
sentencing court chose to depart from the sentencing guidelines).
96. Elderly Man Gets Lighter Sentence, SPOKESMAN REV. SPOKANE CHRON., Oct. 12, 1990,
at A5.
97. Studley, 907 F.2d at 257.
98. Id. at 260; see Elderly Man Gets Lighter Sentence, supra note 96, at A5 (attorneys
pointed out there was no precedent for Judge King's holding).
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leniency "cannot be condoned when it results ... in individual sentencing
contrary to the intent and command of the guidelines." 99 Other scholars take the
point further, arguing that judges would even be remiss if they pointlessly
analyze a law's morality instead of exposing its legality, contradictions, and
inconsistencies. 100

Thus, it is ultimately a hopeless endeavor to openly fight the law, as only
jurors truly have the power to nullify laws.101 Attorneys who fight the law
instead of fighting for a particular interpretation of the law will always lose,
because judges who join the fight will be reversed, sanctioned, or impeached and
replaced by more compliant decision-makers. Judges may also feel concerned
about the embarrassment of being reversed on appeal in a published opinion,102
and a reversal of this sort can jeopardize their ability to exert greater influence on
legal reform as appellate judges.103 For judges who are not concerned with
embarrassment, job security, and potential job ramifications, there is some
intellectual honesty in rejecting a law and, for the sake of the record, tendering a
critique on the law's ethical failings. Ultimately, however, the result is still a
reversal. Just as a disciplinary institution cannot excuse the violation of an ethics
rule for reasons of moral discretion, so too are appellate judges obliged to
reverse a trial judge who rebelliously misapplies the law. Had Judge Cassell
imposed a sentence of less than fifty-five years, then, the first-time offender
would still be imprisoned until at least November 18, 2051.
D.

Option Four

Option Four is likely the most popular option. By interpreting away the
law's immorality, after all, attorneys can participate in the legal system without
having to make the difficult choice between following the law and following
their conscience. But this style of legal reasoning is insincere by definition, and
that insincerity is often obvious. Prigg v. Pennsylvanial04 demonstrates Option
Four reasoning in action, and from one of the finest minds in the history of

99. United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 140 (1st Cir. 1990).
100. See Recent Case, United States v. Hungerford, 465 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2006), 120 HARV.
L. REV. 1988, 1992-93 (2007).
101. See generally Aaron McKnight, Comment, Jury Nullification as a Tool to Balance the
Demands of Law and Justice, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1103 (2013) (explaining that juries have the
power to fight unjust laws).
102. One scholar noted, perhaps somewhat tongue-in-cheek, that "judges dislike reversal."
William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 541 (2001).
103. See W. Bernard Richland, Book Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 180, 182 (1964) (reviewing
HERBERT MITGANG, THE MAN WHO RODE THE TIGER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE SAMUEL
SEABURY (1963)) (analyzing the New York Court of Appeals' decision to refuse an appellate

position to a judge who had publicly criticized several decisions of the appellate court).
104. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
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American jurisprudence. 0 5 In Prigg, Justice Joseph Story reconciled his moral
objection to slavery with his judicial commitments by striking a Pennsylvania
law that forbade the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, but added that while
states could not forbid the Act's enforcement, they were also technically under
no obligation to enforce the Act on behalf of the federal government.106 States
could therefore excuse themselves from enforcing the law by forbidding their
magistrates from hearing cases brought under the Act. 0 7 In response, Congress
shortly thereafter closed this legal loophole in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.1os
The justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court attempted to fight this new act by
declaring it unconstitutional, only to be reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court.1 09
It cannot reflect well on either the legal profession or the justice system when
officers of the law must go to the great lengths of subverting and misinterpreting
a law in order to fix its moral failings, especially if their efforts end up in vain.110
Ironically, there are also clear ethical issues present in an attempt to raise
unreasonable and perhaps dishonest interpretations of a law. As one appellate
judge has said, "The ethical lawyer should only advance reasonable
interpretations of the authoritative texts-interpretations that are plausible from a
public-regarding point of view.""'
IV. THE CASE FOR AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF ETHICAL DISCRETION

Covers' four options identified the full range of choices before attorneys
who are struggling with an Antigone's Dilemma, but only when one relies on the
positivist assumption that "law is law." It is time to consider a fifth option, one
that reframes the positivist framework to relax its rule-based compulsion and
make room for autonomous discretion. It is time to consider a fifth option that
transforms the Model Rules into a process that is more responsive to the unique
process of ethical decision-making by softening categorical rules into rebuttable
presumptions. Dworkin's understanding of law as being based on integrity
offers a useful standard for this fifth option.112 The law as integrity model
borrows from natural law's understanding of law as a branch of morality.113

105. See id.
106. Id. at 612-16.
107. Id. at 614.
108. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repeated 1864).
109. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 526 (1858).
110. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) ("The Court's
power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the
people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare
what it demands.").
111. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 59 (1992).
112. See RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 217-21 (1977).
113. Id. at 218-21.
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Notions of ethics, for Dworkin, are so embedded within the laws that they should
be limited only by the Constitution's demands.11 4 Ethical dilemmas, therefore,
do not pose a choice between law and morality; instead, they pose a choice
between competing legal arguments."t 5 Ethical discretion can play a role under
Dworkin's model, because ethical discretion sheds light on the ethical rule's
inconsistency with its own moral foundation.116 Understanding law as based in
integrity ensures that each individual is an active participant in establishing the
law, and can draw on his or her moral impulses when an unusual and unforeseen
case arises instead of relying on a categorical rule as a mindless crutch. Only
through the affirmative defense of ethical discretion, Dworkin might argue, can
the attorneys and the public "take rights seriously."" 7
Riggs v. Palmer acts as a remarkable example of Dworkian reasoning in
action.11 9 Riggs could-and from the context of positivist law, should have
been a fairly simple case in which a murderer would have inherited from his
victim's estate.120 The New York statute of wills, after all, did not forbid
murderers from inheriting under the murdered victim's will.121

An attorney

could have argued, as the majority opinion decided, that the statute's drafters
could not have intended "that a donee who murdered the testator to make the will
operative should have any benefit under it.',1 22 Without explicitly disregarding

the statute of wills or engaging in ethical discretion, this line of reasoning draws
attention to the fact that the drafters had not anticipated the murderous
inheritance situation.
One can already draw a parallel to the Spaulding and Innocent Convict
scenarios, wherein an attorney might have argued that the Model Rules' drafters
could not have intended to prioritize attomey-client confidentiality over a human
being's very life. In its decision to stray from the statute's literal interpretation,
the majority in Riggs also called on the principle of statutory interpretation that
"[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of
his own wrong . ...

123 Though there are social policy considerations at play in

such a legal principle, the refusal to allow persons to profit from their

114. Id. at 215.
115. COVER, supra note 7, at 199 (stating that anti-slavery judges ignored the "legitimate,
substantial doctrinal innovations that might have made certain cases less a choice between law and
morality and more a choice between alternative legal formulations").
116. Id.
117. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 205. As Dworkin also states, a government "that professes to
recognize individual rights . . [m]ust dispense with the claim that citizens never have a right to
break its law. . . ." Id. at 204.
118. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
119. Id. at 191.
120. Id. at 189.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 190.
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wrongdoing is inarguably based in part on an ethical norm. Because of the
drafters' probable intent and the principle against profiting through one's
wrongdoing, the straightforward ruling in Riggs-namely, that the murderer
could inherit under his victim's estate because the law did not say otherwisewould have violated two of the legal system's overall aims. Faced with a choice
between applying positivist law by letting the murderer inherit or applying
natural law by forbidding such an inheritance, the majority opinion had what
Dworkin often referred to as a "hard case." 24
Some ethicists describe this principle-based reasoning as "remarkable
argumentative acrobatics" that "smuggle common morality in through the back
door."125 Yet Riggs is not an anomaly; a long tradition of case law openly avoids
applying laws, rules, and guidelines if such an application will achieve a result
so absurd that it must have been unintended.126 Even our highest court has, in a
number of contexts, shown a similar desire to avoid the literal, straightforward
interpretation of the law when such an interpretation would conflict with the
legal system's overarching principles.1 27 In Bob Jones University v. United
States,128 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the university's admission practices
of racial discrimination disqualified it for tax exemption status, despite the fact
that the Internal Revenue Code does not explicitly limit its tax exception status
to institutions that follow a non-discrimination policy.129

The "gravitational

force" of the distinctively ethical principle against segregation in education
decisively influenced the Court in Bob Jones.130 The Court then ruled in Green
v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.131 that "[n]o matter how plain the text of the Rule
may be, we cannot accept an interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the
same right to impeach an adversary's testimony that it grants to a civil
defendant."1 32 This is an argument couched in fairness, a rather ethical virtue.

124. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058-59 (1975)
(contending that a "hard case" is one in which judges ignore existing law when faced with a novel
set of facts, thereby creating new law).
125. LUBAN, supra note 61, at 150.
126. See generally, e.g., United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868) (holding that carrying
out the arrest warrant of a mailman did not constitute the crime of hindering the transportation of
mail); see also John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 181 (2011)
("Nowadays, if the text of the statute is clear, that is the end of the matter (unless the statute
produces an absurd result).")).
127. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598 (1983) (holding that the
university could not be tax-exempt under a charitable status because of its discriminatory policies,
although the IRS did not mandate a non-discriminatory requirement for schools.)
128. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
129. Id. at 598 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1969); Rev. Rul. 71-447,
1971-2 C.B. 230).
130. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1036 (1989).
131. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
132. Id. at 510.
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Should the defense attorney in Spaulding have no room in which to argue
that disclosing the aneurysm would have been warranted, in light of the
"gravitational pull" of the principle against unnecessarily causing another human
being's death? If the justices of the Supreme Court find it decisively persuasive
to think that they cannot accept an interpretation that brings about a
fundamentally unfair result, why should attorneys be unable to at least have the
option of making a similar argument before a disciplinary committee or advisory
board? Surely such arguments should at least factor into the disciplinary
institution's decision-making as a mitigating factor to the violation. Interestingly,
the trial court in Spaulding relied on a principle-oriented style of reasoning in its
ultimate ruling.1 33 The court ruled that while the defense attorney could not have
disclosed the aneurysm to the plaintiff (at least, without first securing the
defendant's permission), the defense attorney nevertheless did violate his
obligation to be candid before the tribunal by not disclosing the aneurysm to the
court.1 34 For that act of fraud on the court, the trial court vacated the settlement

reached between the defendant and plaintiff.1 35 In fact, the observation about
this principle-based reasoning being acrobatics that smuggles common morality
in through the back door was made in reference to Spaulding's reasoning.136 As
true as that observation may be, it would be more accurate to say that the
reasoning is an act of acrobatics that carries common morality in through the
front door.
While the "acrobatics" remark appears to be inaccurate, critics note a
number of other perfectly valid concerns with Dworkin's integrity-based
model. 137 Reasonable attorneys, whether in gray suits or in black robes, will
invariably disagree about whether and how strongly certain laws possess or lack
moral impulses. In a pluralistic society, reasonable people can and will
irreconcilably disagree on the moral priorities behind pro-choice versus pro-life
arguments, arguments for homosexual unions versus arguments for religious
liberty, and all other manner of intractable moral dilemmas.13 8 Indeed, the
Model Rules begin with an opening section that "acknowledges the lawyer's
multiple-and, at times, conflicting-sources of ethical responsibility, including
not only ethics rules and other law, but also the lawyer's 'personal conscience'

133. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 709 (Minn. 1962).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 710.
136. See LUBAN, supra note 61, at 150 (citing Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d 704) (arguing that the
court in Spauldinghad to "smuggle common morality in through the back door").
137. See generally Wendel, supra note 18, at 36 ("This Dworkinian conception maintains that
there is something about the lawyer's role which generates moral duties that would not apply to a
similarly situated nonprofessional.").
138. See id. at 4 ("Furthermore, appeals to shared values inevitably provoke the question of
whether these values are really shared across class, racial, ethnic, and gender boundaries, or whether
they are merely the values of the dominant class, dressed in spuriously universal garb.").
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and the 'legal profession's ideals of public service.""1 39 The stability and
predictability of the judicial system and its rules would also be severely
undermined if lawyers and judges based the binding interpretation of laws on
their own personal sense of morality, which already assumes that all people have
clear-cut, articulable moral stances.1 40 Positivist thinkers as far back as Bentham
raised prescient concerns about the anarchist implications of, "This ought not to
be the law, therefore it is not . . .. 141

Scholars of natural law generally advocate for one of two solutions to the
aforementioned concerns.142 One solution adopts the four-pronged test used in
the necessity defense to criminal acts. To invoke the necessity defense, a person
must show "(1) that he was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil;
(2) that he acted to prevent imminent harm; (3) that he reasonably anticipated a
causal relation between his conduct and the harm to be avoided; and (4) that
there were no other legal alternatives to violating the law."1 43 However, the
necessity defense must surpass quite a high bar before it can apply to excuse a
person's conduct.1 44 Reasonable people can disagree on the question of what
constitutes an evil at all, and whether an individual chose the lesser evil. The
imminent harm requirement is difficult to meet because it requires, "'a clear and
imminent danger, not one which is debatable or speculative.""1 45 Lastly, the
necessity defense can often fail because the defendant did have legal alternatives
to consider, and courts "have not been approving
of arguments that the legal
46
alternatives [were] ineffective or inadequate."'1
Professor William H. Simon offered a more promising, though still
imperfect, solution.147 His Contextual View Model asserts that ethical decisions

139. Samuel J. Levine, Taking the EthicalDuty to Self Seriously: An Note in Memory of Fred

Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 285, 293 (2011).
140. Fuller, supra note 47, at 655 ("[M]oral confusion reaches its height when a court refuses
to apply something it admits to be law . . . .").
141. Hart, supra note 37, at 598; see also Fuller, supra note 47, at 224-25 (Contending that
positivism has never been comfortable with interpretation: "This is precisely because it brings to
open expression 'the cooperative nature of the task of maintaining legality."').
142. See generally Yaroshefsky, supra note 62, at 589 (contending that necessity as a defense,
arising under criminal common law, "is justified because it . . .produces a net benefit to society");
see also SIMON, supra note 30, at 9 (arguing that lawyers should take action for the promotion of
justice).
143. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 62, at 590 (quoting United States v. Aquilar, 883 F.2d 662,
693 (9th Cir. 1989); William P. Quigley, The Necessity Defense in Civil Disobedience Cases: Bring
in the Jury, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 3, 12 (2003)).
144. See Yaroshefsy, supra note 62, at 590 (citing Quigley, supra note 143, at 72) ("This
defense presents significant hurdles to an actor who intends to invoke it."); see also United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001) ("Even at common law, the defense of
necessity was somewhat controversial.").
145. Yaroshefsky, supra note 62, at 590 (quoting Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d
457, 461 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982)).
146. Id. at 591.
147. See SIMON, supra note 30, at 9.
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"often turn on the 'underlying merits' of an issue.1 48 To Simon, the Model
Rules impose an ethical decision-making responsibility on attorneys that is
analogous to the "'seek justice, not merely [a conviction]' ethical decisionmaking responsibility that the Model Rules impose on American prosecutors.1 49
In the Spaulding and Innocent Convict scenarios where the Model Rules'
inflexibility on confidentiality jeopardized a person's life, Simon argues in favor
of Option Two ethical disobedience, finding that an attorney must disclose and
must "consider disclosure as a form of nullification."', 5 0 To Simon, acts that
result in "substantial injustice" lie beyond the bounds of the Model Rules
because an attorney's duties to justice take precedence over the attorney's duties
to his or her client. 15' The "substantial injustice" reasoning already reflects the
Supreme Court's language in Green about being unable to accept an
interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the same cross-examination rights
that civil defendants enjoy.152 Further, the Supreme Court's language about
gravitational pullS153 and absurd results would also fit well into Simon's
model.1 54

But Simon's calls for "defiance" may be so strong as to undermine the
viability of the model as a whole. "5 Attorneys cannot actually nullify a law
outside of a jury room and, therefore, they remain accountable to a disciplinary
institution for any conduct that violates the Model Rules. In light of the fact that
the attorneys have engaged in ethical disobedience instead of ethical discretion,
their only hope is that the disciplinary institution resorts to prosecutorial
discretion or disciplinary leniency.1 56 If the disciplinary institution does so,
however, it does so in secret because the Model Rules leave no room for
discretion and leniency. Further, it is unlikely that a disciplinary institution
would extend any leniency. Lawlessness and defiance are both especially

148. Id.
149. Id. at 10; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 AM. BAR Ass'N

1980.
150. SIMON, supra note 30, at 164.
151. See id. at 56 (contending that "the agency rule and the 'substantial injustice' rule are

better than the bar's current rule").
152. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 (1989).
153. See Eskridge, supra note 130, at 1036.
154. See Green, 490 U.S. at 527 ("We are confronted here with a statute which, if interpreted
literally, produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result.").
155. See SIMON, supra note 30, at 56 (arguing that the Model Rules "rationale offered for the
confidentiality rule is ludicrously inconsistent with its substance").
156. The Wisconsin State Bar Committee of Professional Ethics offered the possibility of
incorporating prosecutorial discretion or disciplinary leniency in a 1989 opinion, expressing the
hope that "disciplinary agencies and courts will react to these kinds of situations in a manner which
encourages lawyers to exercise sound discretion in taking actions to prevent serious harm to
innocent persons." Wisconsin State Bar Comm. of Prof 1 Ethics, Op. E-89-11 (1989).
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difficult subjects to be lenient about, after all, for lawyers whose job is primarily
if not exclusively "to facilitate planning and compliance with the law."1 7
Aside from the issues with Type Two solutions that achieve nothing except
the needless destruction of legal careers, Simon's proposal is as nondiscretionary, categorical, and formalistic as the Model Rules have proven to be.
After all, he seems to state that an attorney faced with a Spaulding or Innocent
Convict scenario must disclose the aneurysm, whatever the consequences may
be. By positing that there are clearly "right" and "wrong" solutions to moral
problems,
he seems to have proposed the very kind of mechanical decisionmaking process that he had set out to reject. Naturally, then, the Contextual
View Model's use of clear-cut rules erases any need for establishing standards
for attorneys to draw on for guidance, in the event that they are faced with an
unusual moral dilemma that Simon's directives have not foreseen.
This lack of standards also creates an open-ended subjectivity that permits
lawyers to defy the Model Rules in unpredictable ways. Attorneys should take
care not to bring reasonable, articulable acts of ethical discretion into the realm
of arbitrary, judgmental acts of ethical paternalism. As one scholar put it,
If the lawyer decides not to inform her client that he has the legal right
to disinherit his children [because she feels that such a disinheritance
would be cruel], then she effectively assumes an arrogant posture of
moral superiority, since treating this information about the legal system
as 'dangerous knowledge,' akin to a doctor refusing to tell a patient the
lethal dose of a medication, assumes that the lawyer has superior
expertise in evaluating the morality of" how the client wishes to dispose
of his assets.1 59 Whereas the Model Rules "restrict[] the range of
considerations the decisionmaker may take into account,
Simon's model suffers from the opposite problem of permitting too much room
for considering ethical disobedience.160
This Essay offers an alternative model-one that begins with Dworkin's
work, then adds to it. Dworkin put forward a two-prong test for interpreting the
validity of ethical discretion without engaging in overly discretionary
judgment.161
Under Prong One, the defendant's arguments must meet a
threshold "fitness" test by being coherent in principle with existing law.162 If the

157. See Wendel, supra note 18, at 52.
158. See SIMON, supra note 30, at 162-69 (discussing three examples of moral issues lawyers
have faced and stating the correct solution to the three issues).
159. See Wendel, supra note 18, at 30-3 1.
160. See SIMON, supra note 30, at 9.
161. See DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 255 (stating that there the two prongs are fit and
justification).
162. See id.
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interpretation is "fit," then under Prong Two a person determines the soundness
of the interpretation by determining which interpretation "provides the best
moral justification of the relevant legal materials."1 63 The two-prong fitness and
soundness test helps ensure the interpretation's objectivity and the rules'
"ruleness," while also avoiding the moral skepticism that grounds positivism.164

One major setback to Dworkin's model is that it does not seem to offer a
straightforward definition for ethical discretion. Ethical discretion should be
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the action or actions taken in
violation of the Model Rules resulted from ethical considerations that would
have compelled a reasonable person to have also taken comparable action or
actions. This definition distinguishes ethical discretion from unethical conduct,
which would be an unjustifiable violation of the Model Rules. This definition
also distinguishes ethical discretion from ethical misconduct, which would result
from an actor's negligence, ignorance, or self-serving desires. A second major
setback to Dworkin's model is that its efforts to counter the Model Rules' rigid
prescriptions with flexible standards seem to have the effect of making ethics a
discretionary endeavor.165 In other words, Dworkin's model would help an
attorney defend his or her decision to violate the Model Rules, but it would only
apply to attorneys who decided to violate the Model Rules.
Certain attorneys will voluntarily engage in ethical discretion, with or
without an affirmative defense to draw on for aid. But many attorneys operate
on a very heavy workload, and may also feel distracted by an increasingly
competitive and shrinking legal market. For attorneys with several pressing
deadlines hanging over their head and no strong ethical preferences about how to
resolve an issue, the categorical Model Rules are simply a time-effective solution
to what would otherwise be a dilemma. Just as many judges felt relieved when
the mandatory sentencing guidelines took the difficult moral question out of their
hands, so too do many attorneys feel relieved by the fact that there are black-andwhite rules on ethical conduct. Scholars note that "lawyers have come to use the
model of client-oriented ethics as a shield, both for defending behavior and for
avoiding introspection regarding moral issues." 66
Ideally, then, a reconceptualization of the Model Rules can strike a balance
between the need to take ethics seriously and the reasonable discretion that
individuals should exercise in resolving ethical problems. The balance would
obligate attorneys to consider obeying or disobeying the Model Rules' suggested
behavior, then articulating the reasoning behind why that attorney obeyed the

163. DYZENHAUS, supra note 46, at 25.
164. See DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 24-25.
165. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Pmbl. at 11.
166. Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interest, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1303, 1349 (1995) (citing KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT
OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK 121 (1985)) (discussing lawyers' ability to make decisions about ethics
and methods of practice).
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Model Rules or acted on his or her discretion instead. Presumptions prescribe
ethical deliberation while leaving the decision itself up to the attorneys, who can
draw on Dworkin's "fitness" and "soundness" tests (as well as the ABA's ethical
hotlines and advisory opinions) to help prevent them from accidentally abusing
their discretion. Regardless of the decision reached, attorneys should engage in
such deliberation or risk disciplinary sanctions.
V.

THE ADVANTAGES OF A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION

A.

CurrentPractices

In practice, disciplinary institutions do not necessarily apply the Model
Rules with the rigidity that the rules' formality suggests.167 In Ankerman v.
Mancuso,168 for instance, the court enforced a property agreement despite the
fact that an attorney had entered into the agreement in clear violation of the
Model Rules.1 69 Unlike the Spaulding court, the Ankerman court seemed
unwilling to allow the Model Rules to affect non-disciplinary matters.1 7 0 It
would be inaccurate to believe that reframing the Model Rules as presumptions
would mark a major break from current practices. If anything, the current
practice is somewhat inconsistent, with some courts taking a positivist approach
to the Model Rules' interpretation and other courts using Ankerman's natural law
approach.
On a more general note, it is uncanny that a profession defined by its
openness to and reliance on the adversarial process should rigidly enforce ethical
conduct, one of the most open-ended subjects.' 7
To suggest that the legal
system is a closed one is to delegitimize a great deal of what courts routinely
dol72 and what legal reasoning ultimately is.173 Without the adversarial process,

167. See generally Fredrick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 511-38 (1988) (proposing
that formalism relates to rules in only three ways: through a denial of choice of norms, denial of
choice between norms, or literalistic refusal to sacrifice rules to results).

168. Ankerman v. Mancuso, 830 A.2d 388 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003), aff'd, 860 A.2d 244 (Coin.
2004).
169. Id. at 393.
170. Id. at 389-90.
171. See THOMAS MORAWETZ, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 50-51 (1980) (describing the
distinction between closed and open systems, and stating that the law is best understood as an open
system because the view of law as a closed system is "oddly defective . . . insofar as its rules have
open texture and therefore generate hard cases").
172. See DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 13; see also DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 216-17
(describing how the legal system is open because it is tested and developed by citizens and the
adversary process).
173. See Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously: Ethical Deliberation as

Ethical Obligation, 37 IND. L. REV. 21, 63 (2003) ("As every new law student quickly discovers,
legal reasoning is not susceptible to the same formalistic structures of logic that may be applied in
such disciplines as mathematics or the natural sciences. Instead, legal arguments and conclusions

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol67/iss1/7

22

Pearsall: Revisiting Antigone's Dilemma: Why the Model Rules of Professiona
2015]

REVISITING ANTIGONE'S DILEMMA

185

the law's development would stagnate just as the development of the Model
Rules has stagnated in recent decades instead of evolving as a relevant guideline
that can address new ethical problems as they arise, and not years later. In an
area as dynamic as the practice of law, attorneys will always need relevant,
specific, and timely guidance from the Model Rules.1 74 There is no escaping the
adversarial process; even a more compliant court would presumably admit that
the interpretation of the Model Rules, like the interpretation of the words of any
text, depends on a number of competing political, ethical, social, and other
interpretive theories that are ripe for argument. 7 5
B.

The Underlying Principlesof the Model Rules

Second, an act of ethical discretion would not disobediently stray from the
Model Rules. Instead, a valid act of ethical discretion would obediently comply
with the rules' explicitly stated goals and principles. The Model Rules'
prefatory comments state, for instance, that the rules do not "exhaust the moral
and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human
activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a

are necessarily derived through complex modes of interpretation, often based in potentially
imprecise factors including textual analysis, reasoning by analogy, and policy considerations.").
174. The importance of guidance is vividly illustrated in the case of Lieutenant Commander
Matthew Diaz. In 2004, Diaz saw a six-month tour as Deputy Staff Judge Advocate in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. Tim Golden, Naming Names at Gitmo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at
78, 80-81. Just two years short of retirement, Diaz was described by his superiors as "'the
consummate naval officer' and "'a stellar leader of unquestionable integrity."' Id. at 81. Feeling a
moral obligation to correct Guantanamo Bay's failure to follow the habeas corpus rules set out in
Rasul, Diaz anonymously sent out thirty-nine page list of 551 names of Guantanamo detainees to
the Center for Constitutional Rights. See id. (describing how Diaz sent the print-out). After the
government traced the document to Diaz through his fingerprints. See id. at 80 (describing how the
government traced Diaz through his fingerprints). Diaz explained his motivations before the courtmartial and outlined a defense based on moral obligation. See Kate Wiltrout, Naval Officer
Sentenced to Six Months in Prison, Discharge, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (May 18, 2007, http://
hamptonroads.com/node/268001. Despite the fact that the federal government itself had released
the list of detainees two months before Diaz's trial, Diaz was found guilty of a number of crimes
and sentenced to half a year in prison, dismissal from the Navy, and loss of pay and pension. See id.
Of course, "the ramifications of an individual choosing to commit an illegal act, in order to avoid
what they [sic] perceive to be a greater harm, are drastically different in the military than they are in
civilian life . . . . Such a decision affects an individual's shipmates, the safety and efficiency of the
ship, as well as the effectiveness of the mission." United States v. Olinger, 47 M.J. 545, 551 (N-M.
Ct. Crim. App. 1997), aff'd, 50 M.J. 365 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (dismissal of the necessity defense of a
Navy officer who left his post to care for his depressed and suicidal wife). National security
concerns also play a unique role in the military context. Personal discretion can severely, if
unintentionally, jeopardize national security or national interests. But, drawing from Diaz's
example, perhaps it is possible to allow ethical discretion for civilian lawyers.
175. Schauer, supra note 167, at 514 (citing Hart, supra note 37, at 608-12)).
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framework for the ethical practice of law."1 76 The preamble to the Model Rules
also states that although the rules often "prescribe terms for resolving such
[ethical] conflicts[,]" there remain "many difficult issues of professional
discretion . . . [that]

must be resolved

through the

exercise

of sensitive

professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the
Rules." 7 The necessary implication of these statements, taken together, is that
attorneys have a great deal of space in which to lawyer with honor. 178
The Spaudling attorney should have been able to draw on statements like
these in defense of an unsanctioned yet justifiable disclosure of the aneurysm.
The attorney in Spaulding could have analogized his situation to the handful of
exceptions that the Model Rules carve out for the non-disclosure of attorneyclient confidences. The Model Rules permit attorneys to disclose otherwise
confidential information about "[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime
and the information necessary to prevent the crime."1 79 Further, several advisory
opinions permit the disclosure of a client's impending suicide attempt. 80 Under
Dworkin's model, the Spaudling attorney should have been able to justify a
disclosure of the plaintiffs aneurysm by pointing to these statements as
embedding the principle that attorneys should use their special privileges to help
reduce crime, serious bodily injury, and death in society, to the point that the
reduction of crime, serious bodily injury and death all take precedence over
matters of confidentiality.'' The defense attorney in Spaulding could have also
pre-emptively argued that disclosing the aneurysm would not have violated the
confidentiality rules' intention of facilitating frank client disclosure.182 First, the
plaintiff could have discovered his aneurysm on his own-and in fact, he should
have discovered it, had his physician and attorney not been unusually negligent.

176. MODEL RULES, supra note 10, at 11; see also Alan H. Goldman, Confidentiality, Rules,
and Codes of Ethics, 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 8, 10 (1984) ("[N]o rule, not even one with built-in
exceptions, can capture the lawyer's moral duties in all the situations he might encounter.").
177. MODEL RULES, supra note 25, at Pmbl. 10.
178. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1084
(1988) (stating that disciplinary rules "are likely to leave a good deal of autonomy to individual
lawyers.").
179. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONS1BILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (Am. BAR Ass'N 1983).
180. See, e.g., Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics of the New York State Bar Ass'n, Op. 486 at 3 (1978)
(The "underlying common law and statutory policies of deep concern for the preservation of human
life and the prevention of suicide.").
181. Of course, attorneys would have to be careful in drawing up inferences about what is
embedded in the rules. After all the rules explicitly forbid disclosure for fraudulent and tortious
acts, despite the fact that they can also lead to terrible consequences for society. In such cases, the
drafters have already foreseen the potential ethical conflict but decided that the importance of
securing a trusting and open relationship between attorneys and clients outweighs the unfortunate
scenario in which the client has engaged in fraudulent or tortious behavior.
182. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 131 (2d ed. supp. 1998)

(discussing the "zone of privacy" that confidentiality creates); see also 2 FLOYD R. MECHEM, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 1877-79 (2d ed. 1914) (discussing the goals of confidentiality).
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And second, the defense lawyer found the aneurysm through discovery, not
through a confidential statement from Spaulding himself. By turning the rules
into rebuttable presumptions of how attorneys should act and by basing acts of
ethical discretion on the rules' state principles, an ethical discretion defense
would enable some discretion without undermining the rules' "ruleness."
C. PromptResolution ofNovel Ethical Problems as They Arise
Third, this Essay's ethical discretion doctrine would allow attorneys to
address novel ethical problems as they arise in real time. Though the Spaulding
and Innocent Convict dilemmas are no longer pressing matters because of an
update to the Model Rules,' 8 3 both Spaulding and the Innocent Convict problem
were troubling attorneys across the nations for years before the ABA announced
its delayed reaction. When the Moral Rules are written so rigidly, it asks too
much to assume that they can be quickly redrafted when the next Spaudling
problem arises. Instead, it will by design take several years and several
unfortunate moral failures before the Model Rules can address the next
Spaudling scenario and reclaim the moral compass it aspires to have. Instead of
waiting for the lumbering bureaucratic process to fix the ethical problem while
their client is suffering, attorneys who can act with ethical discretion would at
once bring to light the ethical problem.
For that very reason, an ABA committee has already considered the
possibility of making room for ethical discretion, stating that "whether a lawyer
would decide to risk disciplinary sanctions ... would depend upon the lawyer's
assessment of a number of factors and the strength of the lawyer's moral
convictions that disclosure was necessary, regardless of the potential personal
consequences to the lawyer."1 84 In a similar advisory opinion, an ABA
committee speculated that attorneys should be able to take refuge in a "'moral
compulsion' exception to the Model Rules where the attorney disclosed the
client's AIDs condition to the client's live-in girlfriend.
The ethical discretion
doctrine merely adds that when an attorney takes appropriate discretion, that
action should not result in any consequences besides perhaps an update to the
Model Rules.
D. ProactiveEthical Conduct
Fourth, attorneys under the current formalistic regime have no reason to seek
advisory opinions. If a violation of the rules is not permitted, then a violation
(however morally compelling it may be) is simply not permitted and will result

183. MODEL RULES, supra note 10, at r. 1.6(b)(1).

184. Wisconsin State Bar Comm. of Profl Ethics, Op. E-89-11 (1989).
185. See Comm. on Profl Ethics of Delaware State Bar Ass'n, Op. 1988-2 (1988).
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in disciplinary sanctions. When the rules are so categorical, requests for an
advisory opinion are a frivolous struggle.
The positivist approach
unintentionally demands attorneys to look away from the unethical, to tolerate
the intolerable, to close their eyes to injustice instead of lawyering with their
eyes wide open. Such behavior truly strikes a blow to the profession, and
"implicitly slights the moral basis of the majority's laws."1 86
When there is room for discretion, attorneys will certainly be willing to at
least ask an advisory board if the unique circumstances warrant discretion.
Indeed, attorneys might make the request for advice part of their routine if
advisory opinions would help protect the attorneys from abusing their ethical
discretion. Disturbingly, there is a serious lack of disciplinary cases in which
attorneys raise the defense of ethical discretion, moral compulsion, or similar
arguments. 8 7 This dearth strongly suggests that attorneys who are engaging in
ethical discretion-attorneys like Lieutenant Commander Matthew Diaz,
perhaps-are doing so in secret. Given the likelihood that at least some
attorneys will engage in ethical discretion, even if in secret, it would greatly
serve the interests of transparency for attorneys to have reason to ask the
advisory board for its recommendation. Even without the advisory board's
recommendation, an open act of ethical discretion is still more helpful to the
legal profession than a secret act of ethical discretion. Secret acts of discretion
may help clients on a case-for-case basis, but it is more important for this
profession to create precedent and guidance for other attorneys who will
inevitably face similar circumstances.
E.

The Image of the Profession

Fifth, ethical discretion promises to best serve the legal profession's image
in the hearts and minds of non-lawyers. The public's opinion about the legal
profession undoubtedly has a direct and lasting impact on the quantity and
quality of individuals who seek a legal degree. In the wake of a scandal like the
affair with Enron, non-lawyers should wonder, "But where were the lawyers?" 88
Now the public has come to take it for granted that attorneys are involved in, if
not leading the charge of, major scandals. Increasingly, "but where were the
lawyers" is turning into "but which lawyer was it this time?" If attorneys are

186. See Wendel, supra note 18, at 81.
187. See generally MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Pmbl. at 11 (stating that the rules do not
contain all of the things that a law should consider because "no worthwhile human activity can be
completely defined by legal rules."); SIMON, supra note 30, at 9 (discussing that lawyers should
engage in ethical decision-making by considering the situation at hand and making the choice that is
the most likely to "promote justice").

188. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) (expressing a
similar sentiment of "where were [the] professionals?" with regards to the Lincoln Savings and
Loan Association scandal).
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permitted to take acts of ethical discretion when the Model Rules' suggestions
are inappropriate and disciplinary institutions are permitted to uphold such acts,
then the legal profession would be putting its best face forward.
And with regards to compliance, one can only expect half-hearted and
halfway compliance when the Model Rules merely burden and frighten attorneys
instead of inspire them. One might mistake the Model Rules in their current
form as the narrator in Tolstoy's What Is to Be Done?,189 the narrator who
reflects,
It is as if I were sitting on the neck of a man, and, having quite crushed
him down, I compel him to carry me, and will not alight from off his
shoulders, while I assure myself and others that I am very sorry for him,
and wish to ease his condition by every means in my power except by
getting off his back.1 90
Attorneys who find that their "primary motivation for adherence to ethics
codes owes more to a shared sense of values than to the threat of punishment"
are more likely to comply under a Model Rules that permits ethical discretion
than one that does not.191 And that is precisely why ethical discretion is best
suited to promoting the nobility of this profession.
VI. CONCLUSION

By imposing a uniquely positivist kind of law on attorney conduct, the
Model Rules force the legal profession to gaze at the outmost limits of positive
law. No law or rule should force an attorney to make an Antigone's choice
between doing what is legal and doing what is right. Even in the context of
military law, with its national security concerns and justifiably strict hierarchy,
the Manual for Courts-Martial states that "an order . .. may be inferred to be
lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate," so that orders are only
presumptively binding and may be rebutted by evidence of their illegality.192
Under the current regime, attorneys can ignore their conscience, ignore the
dilemma by withdrawing from the case, ignore the law, or ignore the law's
original intent by reaching an alternative interpretation that aligns with the
conclusion they desire. This Essay has explored the critical shortcomings of
these options, then proposed that instead of adapting attorney conduct to the

189. LEO TOLSTOY, What Is to Be Done?, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LYOF N. TOLSTOI 81

(New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1899).
190. Id.
191. Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Obligations Seriously: A Look at American Codes of
ProfessionalResponsibility Through a Perspectiveof Jewish Law and Ethics, 57 CATH. U. L. REV.
165, 199-200 (2007).
192. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. IV, 14.c. (2)(a)(i) (2005).
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Model Rules, it is the Model Rules that need to adapt to the hard realities on the
ground. Dworkin's understanding of "law as integrity" offers great promise as a
method through which natural law and the adversarial process can revitalize the
Model Rules. This new model can recapture the Model Rules' presumed intent
to ease the profession's ability to lawyer with honor. Dworkin's model and this
Essay's additions to it reconceptualize the Model Rules as rebuttable
presumptions, presumptions that attorneys must consider and can rebut if they
find sufficient reason to act otherwise. This reconceptualization of the Model
Rules brings us back to the ABA's original "canons" approach to regulating
ethical conduct in 1905, but adds the necessary enforcement mechanisms to
ensure compliance this time. And perhaps this reconceptualization, with its
affirmative defense of ethical discretion, also offers a glimpse into how to help
resolve the myriad other laws, guidelines, and rules whose inflexibility can, in
extraordinary cases, haunt attorneys with a modern-day Antigone's dilemma.
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